Cite this article as:

Nesterov D. A. Historical Modeling of Asymmetric Conflicts in the British-American Discourse in the Middle of the 1960s. Izvestiya of Saratov University. New series. Series History. International Relations, 2019, vol. 19, iss. 4, pp. 487-493. DOI: https://doi.org/10.18500/1819-4907-2019-19-4-487-493


UDC: 
94(73).092.3
Language: 
Russian

Historical Modeling of Asymmetric Conflicts in the British-American Discourse in the Middle of the 1960s

Abstract

The author of this article comprehensively and systematically analyzes the discussion about the possibilities of historical modeling of asymmetric conflicts that arose in the American and British expert communities in the mid-1960s. The author reveals the reasons for the discrepancy between the final conclusions of the expert opinions of British and American experts on the possibilities and necessity of applying the colonial experience of the British Empire’s anti-insurgency in the conditions of the Vietnam conflict of the mid-1960s.

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